CINDER (Pt. 1): The Human Behaviors That Quietly Erode Security Programs

Complacency. Ignorance. Neglect. Drift. Evasion. Resistance.

A few weeks ago, I was talking with a close friend, someone entirely outside our industry but with an uncanny instinct for how people behave when systems get complicated, how guardrails erode, and how security quietly “breaks down” in everyday life. In the middle of our conversation, they tossed out a surprisingly sharp observation that landed harder than they probably realized. It wasn’t wrapped in security jargon. It wasn’t referencing a framework, control family, or compliance requirement. It was just a human truth: “Most failures don’t happen because people want to do the wrong thing. They happen, because the situation pushes them there.”

That line stuck with me. And the more I replayed it, the more it resonated with what I see inside organizations every day. So, with full respect to their anonymity, I took that insight and began weaving it into the governance and security context I operate in. A world where behavior intersects with requirements, culture shapes risk, and small human decisions compound into significant security outcomes.

What emerged from that reflection is a clearer, more grounded way to talk about the patterns that silently undermine even the most well‑intentioned, well‑architected programs. At the center of it is CINDER, a model that names six predictable human behaviors, Complacency, Ignorance, Neglect, Drift, Evasion, and Resistance. These aren’t exotic or malicious patterns; they are common and deeply human, and they erode security not through dramatic sabotage but through routine decisions made under pressure, habit, confusion, or misaligned incentives. Nevertheless, if left unattended, CINDER will reduce your security foundation to ashes.

What makes this version of CINDER particularly meaningful is that it isn’t floating in abstraction. It’s anchored directly to the frameworks that shape modern security practices. NIST CSF 2.0 has made a deliberate shift by placing Govern at the center of the model, emphasizing that leadership, culture, clarity, and accountability aren’t “nice to have” ideals but the foundation of every outcome. NIST SP 800‑171r3 is written to protect CUI, but its safeguards are broadly applicable and should be used to raise the bar for all organizational information, not just federally sensitive data. NIST SP 800‑171A r3 then completes the equation by providing detailed assessment procedures that transform statements into evidence and remove ambiguity from implementation. And the Secure Controls Framework (SCF) ties these worlds together by offering a normalized, cross‑mapped control set that lets teams operationalize governance in the messy, fast‑moving reality of day‑to‑day work.

When you put all of this together, the human reality my friend pointed out, the behavioral patterns captured in CINDER, and the structural expectations defined by CSF 2.0, 800‑171/ 171A, and the SCF, you get a model that is technically precise and genuinely human‑aware. It acknowledges that people don’t wake up intending to break security; they respond to the pressures, limitations, and incentives placed in front of them. And, if we want strong, sustainable controls, then our systems, governance models, and evidence‑driven processes must be designed to support people rather than push them into the very behaviors that create risk.

That’s all for Part 1, please check back for Part 2!

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